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This paper studies timing games in continuous time where payoﬀs are stochas-
tic and strongly Markovian. The main interest is in characterizing equilibria
where players preempt each other along almost every sample path. It is found
that the existence of such preemption equilibria depends crucially on whether
there is a coordination mechanism that allows for rent equalization or not, and
whether the stochastic payoﬀs admit upward jumps. Through numerical exam-
ples it is argued that the possibility of such coordination improves social welfare
and that the welfare loss due to preemption decreases in uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
In many competitive timing situations the ﬁrst mover has an advantage: the ﬁrm
that ﬁrst adopts a new technology, the ﬁrst developer of a new real-estate oppor-
tunity, etc. However, if the leader role is not exogenously determined, then the
competition to become the leader may erode that ﬁrst mover advantage. Indeed,
the standard prediction from the literature on timing games with a ﬁrst mover ad-
vantage is that preemption equalizes the expected payoﬀs of the ﬁrst and second
mover. This point has been made ever since such early contributions as, for exam-
ple, Posner (1975).
Preemption is often analyzed in a continuous time framework. This can lead to
a coordination problem, because in continuous time it is impossible to distinguish
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1between simultaneous action and immediate reaction. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
solve this problem by using a technique from optimal control which allows them to
show that in two-player deterministic timing games with a ﬁrst mover advantage
there always exists an equilibrium in which rents are equalized. Unfortunately,
their equilibrium concept is rather complicated as it involves players to choose a
distribution function describing the probability with which they act before any point
in time, as well as an “intensity over an interval of atoms” when players wish to
act at the same time. It is this device that allows the derivation of a preemption
equilibrium where (i) players do not act simultaneously when this is not optimal (an
outcome they refer to as a “coordination failure”) and (ii) symmetric players each
act ﬁrst with probability 1/2 at the preemption point.
In most real-life preemptive situations the future is not known with certainty and,
therefore, a deterministic timing game may not be the best modeling tool. Using
techniques from optimal stopping theory, several papers have studied timing games
in which players’ payoﬀs are subject to random shocks.1 This introduces an “option
value of waiting” into the payoﬀs which, in general, delays stopping. As can be
imagined, the addition of uncertainty complicates the game theoretic analysis even
further. As in the deterministic case this is mainly due to the diﬃculty of solving
the coordination problem that arises when it is a best response for both players to
stop while these are only best responses if only one player succeeds. In the literature
this is often solved by making fairly ad-hoc assumptions based on Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985). It is not at all clear, however, that this is appropriate. In addition,
this approach could not deal with asymmetries. Thijssen et al. (2002) extend the
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) concepts in an appropriate way to a stochastic setting.
They show that, qualitatively, the equilibria are not changed by the introduction
of uncertainty. It is not clear, however, how restrictive their assumptions are. In
addition, the level of technicality required to derive the results is such that it is not
readily applicable.
In this paper I take a diﬀerent approach to the problem of preemption in a real
options model. Its contribution is three-fold. First, the analysis presented here sepa-
rates, as much as possible, the timing and coordination issues involved in preemption
models. This makes it easier to prove equilibrium existence and also makes it clearer
how the diﬀerent assumptions needed to guarantee existence of equilibrium interact.
The simplicity of the arguments is based on an exploitation of the strong Markovian
nature of the underlying stochastic process, which allows one to take the range of the
process as the state space, rather than time itself. As a result, this paper presents
1See, for example, Boyer et al. (2004), Pawlina and Kort (2006, 2010), Bouis et al. (2009), Roques
and Savva (2009), Mason and Weeds (2010), and Thijssen (2010).
2a more complete picture of all equilibria that can exist in preemption games. Sec-
ond, this paper starts from fairly general assumptions on primitives, which enables
one to see how economic primitives interact with equilibrium existence. This also
allows for a comprehensive analysis of asymmetric games. Finally, the paper allows
for a large class of underlying stochastic processes. The existing literature almost
exclusively relies on geometric Brownian motion. This paper allows also for an anal-
ysis of other processes such as mean-reverting diﬀusions and L´ evy processes with
downward jumps. Numerical illustrations show that the nature of the underlying
stochastic process has no inﬂuence on the qualitative nature of equilibrium, but can
have a substantial impact on estimates of, for example, values of waiting and welfare
costs of preemption.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic ingredients of the model are de-
scribed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the case where there is no competition for
the leader role, i.e. the standard Stackelberg approach. In this case, no coordination
problem arises. The model is still useful, however, to provide a contrast with the case
of endogenous roles, which is dealt with in Section 4. That section introduces the
main strategy and equilibrium concepts, as well as the equilibrium results regarding
preemptive equilibria in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The arguments
in Section 4 are kept as simple as possible by assuming that the coordination prob-
lem is solved exogenously. In particular, the assumption of rent-equalization turns
out to be crucial for the existence of equilibria in which preemption takes place.
Attention is also paid to equilibria that do not lead to preemptive behaviour. A
non-cooperative defense of why the assumption of rent-equalization is reasonable is
given in Section 5. Implications of the theory for predictions on preemptive behavior
under diﬀerent stochastic processes are presented in Section 6. Numerical examples
show that, both for spectrally negative exponential jump-diﬀusions and exponen-
tial mean-reverting diﬀusions the preemption region is increasing in volatility. This
indicates that preemptive behavior can be expected to be observed more often in
situations with higher levels of uncertainty. This section also shows how the the-
ory can be used to make welfare predictions in a model of industry investment. In
particular, it is illustrated how exogenous versus endogenous ﬁrm roles can lead to
diﬀerent welfare losses. It is found, for example, that (under geometric Brownian
motion) competition for the leader role always leads to a higher social welfare than
a non-competitive situation. It is also shown, however, that the preemptive equilib-
rium does not lead to a social optimum. Interestingly, the welfare loss in both cases
decreases as volatility increases. Section 7, ﬁnally, concludes.
32 The Model
Consider a situation where two players i ∈ {1,2} have to decide on a stopping time
over an inﬁnite time horizon. Their payoﬀs are inﬂuenced by a state-variable which
takes values in E = (a,b) ⊆ R. Let ¯ E denote the closure of E (in the standard
topology on R). For each y ∈ E, the state variable follows a strong Markovian
c` adl` ag (right-continuous with left-limits) semimartingale (Yt)t≥0 on a probability
space (Ω,F,Py), endowed with a ﬁltration (Ft)t≥0, with Y0 = y, Py-a.s. The
process (Yt)t≥0 is assumed to be adapted to (Ft)t≥0.
It is assumed that both players discount payoﬀs at the constant and common
rate r > 0. All strategies in this paper take the form of hitting times. These are
stopping times of the form τ(Y ∗) := inf{t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ Y ∗}, for some Y ∗ ∈ ¯ E, where
τy(a) = 0 and τy(b) = ∞, Py-a.s, for all y ∈ E. For y ∈ E and Y ∗ ∈ ¯ E, let νy(Y ∗)
denote the Laplace transform of τ(Y ∗) (under Py) evaluated at r, i.e.





Note that νy(Y ∗) = 1 for all y ≥ Y ∗, that νy(b) = 0, for all y ∈ E, and that,
because of the strong Markov property, it holds that νy(Y 2) = νy(Y 1)νY 1(Y 2), for
all y < Y 1 < Y 2.
The following assumption is made on the stochastic environment.
Assumption 1. The process (Yt)t≥0 has no upward jumps and is such that for all
y ∈ E the function νy(·) is continuous.
This assumption allows for many underlying processes, like arithmetic Brownian
motion, geometric Brownian motion, mean-reverting diﬀusions, and spectrally neg-
ative L´ evy processes. The requirement that (Yt)t≥0 has no upward jumps is equiva-
lent to saying that the supremum process
￿¯ Yt
￿
t≥0, deﬁned by ¯ Yt = sup0≤s≤t Ys, has
continuous sample paths. This assumption simpliﬁes ﬁnding solutions to the opti-
mal stopping problems below considerably. It also often makes deriving νy(·) fairly
straightforward (see Section 6 for some examples). On the other hand, it limits the
number of types of behavior that are consistent with equilibrium.2
The payoﬀs accruing to the players depend on their “stopping status” k ∈ {0,1},
which indicates whether a player has stopped (k = 1) or not (k = 0). Let Di
k`(y),
y ∈ ¯ E, denote the expected present value of stopping (under Py) to Player i if her
stopping status is k, the stopping status of Player j, j 6= i, is `, and the state variable
has value y. In addition, it is assumed that stopping entails incurring a once oﬀ sunk
cost Ii > 0.
2See Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ ı (2011) for an analysis with positive jumps.
4Assumption 2. For all i ∈ {1,2}, it holds that
1. Di
k`, k,` = 0,1, is continuous on E;
2. Di
10(a) − Di
















Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 ensure that there is a unique threshold for the state
variable where the net present value of being the ﬁrst player to stop becomes positive.
Assumption 2.4 allows for the possibility that it is never optimal to become the






The ﬁnal assumption that is made ensures that waiting forever renders the option
valueless. This assumption essentially rules out speculative bubbles.
Assumption 3. The functions νy(·), and Di
k`(·) are such that limY ∗↑b νy(Y ∗)[Di
1k(Y ∗)−
Di
1`(Y ∗) − Ii] = 0, for all k ≥ `.
3 Exogenous Leader and Follower Role
Before analyzing the game where players vie for the leader role, let’s ﬁrst study
the standard Stackelberg model applied to a situation where players have to choose
stopping times. Assume that Player i is the leader in this game. Player j, hence, is
the follower. The strategies in this game are going to be the thresholds at which the
players exercise their options. We want to allow for the possibilities that Player i
stops immediately, no matter what the value of the state variable, and that Player j
never stops. So, the strategy space is taken to be ¯ E. For a pair of strategies (Y i,Y j),
with Y i ≤ Y j, the payoﬀ to Player i is the leader value, which, for all y ∈ E, is
equal to
Li
y(Y i;Y j) :=Di
00(y) + νy(Y i)[Di
10(Y i) − Di
00(Y i) − Ii]
+ νy(Y j)[Di
11(Y j) − Di
10(Y j)].
(1)
The expected payoﬀ to the follower equals
Fj
y(Y j;Y i) =D
j
00(y) + νy(Y i)[D
j







11(Y j) − D
j




5This formulation depends crucially on the strong Markovian nature of (Yt)t≥0 and
on the assumption that there are no positive jumps. This assumption, namely,




1k(Yτ(Y ∗)) − Di







1k(Y ∗) − Di
0k(Y ∗) − Ii),
for all Y ∗ ∈ ¯ E.
A subgame perfect Markov equilibrium (SPME) is a pair of strategies (¯ Y i, ¯ Y j) ∈
¯ E × ¯ E, such that for all (Y i,Y j) ∈ ¯ E × ¯ E it holds that
Li
y(¯ Y i; ¯ Y j) ≥ Li
y(Y i;Y j), and Fj
y(¯ Y j; ¯ Y i) ≥ Fj
y(Y j;Y i).
The following lemma describes the solutions to the maximization problems faced
by the players.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold. The functions L(·) and F(·) have
unique maximizers Y i
L ∈ E and Y
j




Proof. Existence of Y i
L and Y
j
F follows trivially from the continuity of Di
kl(·) and
νy(·), and the fact that ¯ E is a compact set. Due to Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, and 3, Li
y(·)
attains it maximum on E. The fact that Y i
L ≤ Y
j
F follows from Assumptions 2.3–5.
Uniqueness of Y i





Note that the maximizers of F
j
y(·) are the same as the maximizers of gj(·). Suppose
that Y1 and Y2 are two distinct maximizers of gj, such that (wlog) Y1 < Y2. First,
assume that Y2 < b. Then it holds that gj(Y1) = νY1(Y2)gj(Y2), and, thus, that
gj(Y2) > gj(Y1). Continuity of gj(·) implies that there exists Y3 ∈ (Y1,Y2), such
that gj(Y3) > gj(Y1). Therefore, it holds that






∗ ⇐⇒ νY3(Y2)gj(Y2) < νY1(Y3)gj(Y3)
⇐⇒ νY1(Y2)gj(Y2) = gj(Y1) < νY1(Y3)gj(Y3),
where (∗) follows from gj(Y2) > 0, since Y2 < b. But this is a contradiction to Y1
being a maximizer.
Finally, if Y1 = b is a maximizer, uniqueness follows from the fact that there is
no Y ∗ for which gj(Y ∗) > 0. After all, if there were, then
νy(Y ∗)gj(Y ∗) > νy(b)gj(b) = 0.
A similar reasoning shows uniqueness of Y i
L.
The following proposition describes the unique asymmetric SPME.




The proof of this proposition follows trivially from the uniqueness of Y
j
F and Y i
L.
This asymmetric equilibrium leads to players stopping sequentially. Such equilibria
are referred to in the remainder as sequential stopping equilibria.
Symmetric equilibria may also exist. To derive these, note that, if players choose
symmetric strategies (Y ∗,Y ∗), the payoﬀ to Player i, i = 1,2, equals
Mi
y(Y ∗) :=Li
y(Y ∗;Y ∗) = Fi
y(Y ∗;Y ∗)
=Di
00(y) + νy(Y ∗)[Di
11(Y ∗) − Di
00(Y ∗) − Ii].
(3)
Since symmetric strategies lead Players to stop simultaneously, such equilibria are
referred to as simultaneous stopping equilibria. Note that Mi
y(·) has a unique maxi-
mizer Y i
M ≥ Y i
F. Its proof is trivial and, therefore, omitted.
Proposition 2. For any Y ∗ ≥ Y
j
F, such that Mi




F), for all y ≤ Y ∗,
it holds that (Y ∗,Y ∗) is a SPME.
Note that existence of such joint stopping equilibria is not guaranteed in general.
The sequential stopping equilibrium in proposition 1 always exists.
4 Endogenous Determination of the Leader and Fol-
lower Roles
It is often more realistic to assume that the roles of leader and follower are not exoge-
nously determined, but the outcome of strategic interaction. In games with a ﬁrst
mover advantage players may try to preempt each other. Such preemptive situations
arise whenever the value of becoming the leader exceeds the value of being the fol-
lower, while it is not optimal for either player to stop. Since the purpose of the paper
is to investigate this competition and since any reasonable concept of equilibrium
must have the follower stopping at Y i
F, it will be implicitly assumed in the remainder
that the follower’s strategy is to stop at that threshold. Consequently, the second
argument in (1) and (2) will be dropped for notational convenience. Furthermore,
we use the notation Li(y) := Li
y(y), Fi(y) := Fi
y(y), and Mi(y) := Mi
y(y), for the
instantaneous payoﬀs of becoming the leader, follower, and simultaneous stopping,
respectively.
It can easily be seen that Li
y(Y ∗) ≥ Fi
y(Y ∗) iﬀ Li(Y ∗) ≥ Fi(Y ∗), for all y ∈ E.
Since Li(·) and Fi(·) are continuous, there exists Y i
P < Y i
L such that Li(Y i
P) =
Fi(Y i
P). In fact, due to the monotonicity assumptions in Assumption 2, Y i
P is unique.





























Figure 1: Value functions for leader, follower, and simultaneous stopping. The
underlying stochastic process is a geometric Brownian motion.
which Player i would want to preempt Player j. Hence, the region in which Player i
would wish to preempt Player j is Si
P = [Y i
P,Y i
F). Let the preemption region be
deﬁned as SP := S1
P ∩S2
P. We will focus on games with SP 6= ∅. Obviously, Player i
will only want to preempt Player j if there is a threat that Player j might preempt,
i.e. when y ∈ SP.
Combining this with the results from the previous section, the payoﬀ structure
of the game can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1–3 it holds that for every player i ∈ {1,2} there
exist unique thresholds
1. Y i
F ∈ ¯ E such that Mi(y) = Li(y) = Fi(y), for all y ≥ Y i
F;
2. Y i
L < Y i
F such that maxY ∗ Li
y(Y ∗) = Li(y), for all y ≥ Y i
L;
3. Y i
P < Y i
L such that Li(y) ≥ Fi(y), for all y ≥ Y i
P.
If one is unwilling to make the assumption that (Yt)t≥0 exhibits no positive
jumps, then one could always assume the validity of this lemma, without linking the
payoﬀs to underlying fundamentals.3 A plot of typical value functions is given in
Figure 1.
3This is the approach that is taken in, for example, Thijssen et al. (2002).
84.1 Strategies and Payoﬀs
The main diﬀerence between deterministic timing games – where time is the state
variable – and games where the state variable is a stochastic process is that in
the latter case an agent’s strategy, however deﬁned, can not be forward looking.






values in [0,1], where Xi
t is the probability with which Player i has stopped up





t≥0 has to be a non-decreasing process.
In addition, we want to rule out that players can act on information that has not
yet been released. That is, “insider trading” should not be allowed. These two





t≥0 must (i) be adapted to (Ft)t≥0 and
(ii) have c` agl` ad (left-continuous with right-limits) sample paths. Due to the process





t≥0 being c` agl` ad, stochastic integrals
of the form
R
XidY are well-deﬁned (see Protter (2004)).
For our purposes it suﬃces to restrict attention to strategies that are driven by
stopping times. Let τ be a stopping time (relative to the ﬁltration (Ft)t≥0). The





0 if t < τ,
1 if t ≥ τ.
As already remarked, given the strong Markovian nature of (Yt)t≥0, the inﬁnite
time horizon and the no-positive-jump assumption, all optimal stopping problems
in Section 2 take the form of trigger policies. Therefore, it stands to reason to
focus on threshold strategies. These consist of a single threshold Y i ∈ ¯ E, with
the convention that Player i stops at the induced ﬁrst-hitting time τ(Y i). So, the
strategy space for each player is ¯ E.
Let (Y 1,Y 2) ∈ ¯ E × ¯ E and deﬁne τ := τ(Y 1) ∧ τ(Y 2). Then the expected payoﬀ
to Player i of the pair of thresholds (Y i,Y j) is given by
V i





1[τ(Y i)<τ(Y j)]Li(Yτ) + 1[τ(Y i)>τ(Y j)]Fi(Yτ)





for all y ∈ E. Here Wi(·) is a tie-breaking rule giving the expected payoﬀ if both
players stop at the same time. It will be elaborated on below.
Formally, a stopping game is a tuple Γ = (N,( ¯ E,(V i
y)y∈E))i∈N. A preemption
game is a stopping game Γ with SP 6= ∅. A Markov equilibrium in the stopping
game Γ is a pair of thresholds (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2) ∈ ¯ E× ¯ E, such that V i
y(¯ Y i, ¯ Y j) ≥ V i
y(Y i, ¯ Y j),
for all Y i ∈ ¯ E, all y ∈ E, and all i ∈ {1,2}. A preemption equilibrium is a Markov
equilibrium (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2), such that ¯ Y i < Y i
L, for at least one i ∈ {1,2}. For ε > 0,
9an ε-Markov equilibrium is a pair of strategies (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2) such that for all y ∈ E, all
i ∈ {1,2}, and all Y i ∈ ¯ E it holds that
V i
y(¯ Y i, ¯ Y j) ≥ V i
y(Y i, ¯ Y j) − ε.
A preemption ε-equilibrium is an ε-Markov equilibrium (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2) such that ¯ Y i < Y i
L,
for at least one i ∈ {1,2}.
The tie-breaking rule Wi(·) deserves a bit more explanation. It is introduced
here to allow for coordination between players if both wish to stop simultaneously.
To allow for some generality, this function is assumed to be given by
Wi(y) = pi(y)Li(y) + pj(y)Fi(y) + p3(y)Mi(y), all y ∈ E,
for some (p1(y),p2(y),p3(y)) ≥ 0, with p1(y) + p2(y) + p3(y) = 1. In this set-up
the probability with which Player i stops is pi(y) and the probability that both
stop simultaneously is p3(y). This formulation encompasses most contributions in
the literature. For example, Murto (2004) does not allow coordination and, thus,
assumes p3(y) = 1, all y ∈ E; Weeds (2002) assumes that p1(y) = p2(y) = 1/2,
y ∈ SP and p3(y) = 1 otherwise; and Thijssen et al. (2002) argue, based on an
argument by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for deterministic games, that p3(y) = 0, all
y ∈ SP, but that p1(y) and p2(y) are such that Wi(y) = Fi(y). A preemptive game
which is such that Wi(y) = Fi(y), all y ∈ SP, is called a rent-equalization game.
In Section 5 a non-cooperative defense of the rent-equalization property will be
given. In the remainder of this section, we will mainly be concerned with comparing
the eﬀect of allowing for rent-equalization or not on the nature of equilibria in
preemption games.
4.2 Preemption Equilibria
Throughout this subsection it will be assumed (wlog) that Y 1
L ≤ Y 2
L. The existence
of equilibria depends crucially on the ordering of Y 1
L and Y 2
P, as well as the tie-
breaking rule Wi(·) in the preemption region. The following proposition establishes
that a preemption game has no preemption equilibria if it does not have the rent-
equalization property.
Proposition 3. Let Γ be a preemption game satisfying Assumptions 1–3 with W2(y) <
F2(y), for all y ∈ S2
P. Then no preemptive equilibrium exists.
Proof. Note that a preemption equilibrium can only exist if Y 2
P ≤ Y 1
L.
Let y ∈ (Y 2
P,Y 1
L). Suppose, by contradiction, that (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2) is a preemption
equilibrium. If y ≥ ¯ Y i, i = 1,2, then both players stop simultaneously and
V 2
y (¯ Y 2, ¯ Y 1) = W2(y) < F2(y), which implies that Player 2 wants to deviate.
10If ¯ Y 1 ≤ y < ¯ Y 2, then there exists ˆ Y 1 ∈ (y, ¯ Y 2∧Y 1
L) such that L1
y(ˆ Y 1) > L1
y(¯ Y 1) =
L1(y). This holds because L1
y(·) is increasing on (y, ¯ Y 2 ∧ Y 1
L). So, Player 1 wishes
to deviate. A similar reasoning applies to Player 2 if ¯ Y 2 ≤ y < ¯ Y 1.
In Section 4.3 it will be shown that preemption games without the rent-equalization
property sometimes allow for other equilibria.
If a preemption game satisﬁes the rent-equalization property, the picture looks
very diﬀerent.
Proposition 4. Let Γ be a preemption game satisfying Assumptions 1–3 and the
rent-equalization property.
1. Suppose that Y 2
P ≤ Y 1
L, and that Y 1
P 6= Y 2
P. The following holds:
(a) no preemption equilibrium exists;
(b) if Y 1
P < Y 2
P, then for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that all preemption
ε-equilibria are of the form (Y 1,Y 2
P), for any Y 1 ∈ [Y 2
P − δ,Y 2
P);
(c) if Y 2
P < Y 1
P, then for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that all preemption
ε-equilibria are of the form (Y 1
P,Y 2), for any Y 2 ∈ [Y 1
P − δ,Y 1
P).
2. If Y 2
P > Y 1
L, then no preemption equilibria exist.
3. If Y 1
P = Y 2
P ≡ YP, then (YP,YP) is the unique preemption equilibrium.
Proof. First note that it is obvious that the statements are true for y ≥ Y 1
F ∨Y 2
F.
1. (a) A preemption equilibrium does not exist, since the best response of Player 1
to Player 2’s strategy (Y 2
P) is not well-deﬁned. After all, the function
L1
y(·) is increasing on (a,Y 2
P), so that it does not attain a maximum on
this open set.
(b) Suppose that Y i
F ≤ Y
j
F. Note that Y 2
P < Y i
F, since SP 6= ∅. Let ε > 0.




P − δ) = ε and Y 2
P − δ ≥ Y 1
P. Such a
δ exists because L1
y(·) is continuous and increasing on (a,Y 1
L]. Also, be-
cause of the strong Markovian nature of (Yt)t≥0, δ does not depend on y.
Take any of the proposed equilibrium strategy pairs (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2). Consider
the following cases.




In this case V i
y(¯ Y i, ¯ Y j) = Li(y) = Mi(y) = Fi(y), and V
j
y (¯ Y j, ¯ Y i) =
Wj(y) = Fj(y). Player i has no incentive to deviate, since any deviation
to ˆ Y i > y would lead to a payoﬀ Fi(y). The same holds for Player j.
11ii. y ∈ [Y 2
P,Y i
F).
Note that V k
y (¯ Y k, ¯ Y `) = Wk(y) = Fk(y), for k = 1,2. So, for neither
player would a deviation lead to a higher payoﬀ.
iii. y < Y 2
P.
As in case (ii), Player 2 has no incentive to deviate to any ˆ Y 2 > ¯ Y 1. Let
ˆ Y 2 < ¯ Y 1, Because of the no-positive-jump assumption it holds that
L2
y(ˆ Y 2) ≤ L2
y(¯ Y 1) ≤ F2
y(¯ Y 1),
where the ﬁrst inequality holds because ˆ Y 2 < ¯ Y 1 < Y 2
L and L2
y(·) is non-
decreasing on (a,Y 2
L), and the second inequality holds by deﬁnition since
¯ Y 1 < Y 2
P. Because ¯ Y 1 < Y 1
L it holds that L1
y(ˆ Y 1) < L1
y(¯ Y 1) for any ˆ Y 1 <
¯ Y 1. Since Y 1
L ≥ Y 2
P > Y 1





all ε-best-responses to ¯ Y 2 = Y 2
P are all in the interval (Y 2
P −δ,Y 2
P). Since
¯ Y 1 ∈ (Y 2
P − δ,Y 2
P), (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2) constitutes an ε-Markov equilibrium.
As becomes clear from the above, any ε-Markov equilibrium must have
¯ Y 2 ≥ Y 2
P. However, there can be no preemption ε-equilibrium with Y 2
F ≥
¯ Y 2 > Y 2
P. For suppose there is. Then, Player 1’s ε-best response will be
to stop at some ˆ Y 1 ∈ (¯ Y 2 − δ, ¯ Y 2). For small enough ε, it will hold that
¯ Y 2 − δ > Y 2
P. In that case Player 2 will wish to deviate to ˆ Y 2 = ¯ Y 2 − δ.
(c) The proof is analogous to that for the previous statement.
2. In this case it is dominant for Player i to wait until Y i
L is hit. Consequently,
she will never choose a strategy ¯ Y i < Y i
L. Given this, Player j also has no
incentive to choose a strategy ¯ Y j < Y 2
L.
3. Because of rent equalization, at YP each player is indiﬀerent between stopping
immediately and waiting. If one player chooses YP, then the other player has
no incentive to deviate from YP because for all ˆ Y i < YP, it holds that
Li
y(ˆ Y i) < Fi
y(ˆ Y i) ≤ Fi
y(YP).
So, (YP,YP) is a preemption equilibrium.
Suppose, however, that there is another preemption equilibrium (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2),
with, say, YP < ¯ Y 1 ≤ ¯ Y 2. Let y ≤ YP. Because of continuity of L2
y(·)
and F2
y(·), Player 2 can ﬁnd δ > 0, such that
ν¯ Y 1−δ(¯ Y 1)[F2(¯ Y 1) − D2
00(¯ Y 1)] < L2(¯ Y 1 − δ) − D2
00(¯ Y 1 − δ).
This, in turn, implies that L2
y(¯ Y 1 − δ) > F2
y(¯ Y 1), and, thus, that Player 2
should deviate.
124.3 Other Equilibria
Apart from preemption equilibria, preemption games may exhibit other equilibria.
Again, it will be assumed throughout that Y 1
L ≤ Y 2
L.
4.3.1 Sequential Equilibria
In this subsection we look at equilibria where players stop sequentially. The following
lemma is trivial, but useful.
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a preemption game satisfying Assumptions 1–3. Let YF :=
Y 1
F ∨ Y 2
F. If Player j plays a strategy Y j ≤ YF, then it is weakly dominant for
Player i to choose a strategy Y i ≤ YF.
Proof. Suppose that Player j plays Y j ≤ YF and that Player i chooses a strategy
Y i ∈ ¯ E, with Y i > Y i
F. Let y ∈ [Y i
F,Y i). Consider the following two cases.
1. Y j ≤ y.
In this case Player j becomes the leader and, therefore, Player i’s expected payoﬀ is
Fi(y). Deviating to Y i = Y i
F would lead to the expected payoﬀ Mi(y) = Fi(y).
2. Y j > y.
In this case Player i can become the leader and get an expected payoﬀ Li(y) > Fi(y)
if y < Y
j
F. Otherwise, Player i gets the payoﬀ Mi(y) = Fi(y).
In light of this lemma we will only consider sequential Markov equilibria with
Y i ≤ Y i
F in this subsection. The sequential equilibrium from Proposition 1 sur-
vives in preemption games without the rent-equalization property as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a preemption stopping game satisfying Assumptions 1–3.
Assume that the rent-equalization property does not hold. If Y 2
P ≥ Y 2
L, then (Y 1
L,Y 2
F)
constitutes a Markov equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following cases.
1. y ≥ Y 2
F
In this region Fi(y) = Mi(y) = Li(y), for both players. Therefore, it is optimal for
both to stop.
2. Y 1
L ≤ y < Y 2
F
Given that Player 1 stops and W2(y) < F2(y), Player 2 has no incentive to deviate.
Conversely, given that Player 2 does not stop immediately it is optimal for Player 1
13to stop.
3. y < Y 1
L
Given that Player 2 does not stop before Y 2
F is hit it is optimal for Player 1 to
wait until Y 1
L is reached. Conversely, since Y 2
L ≥ Y 1
L and Y 2
P ≥ Y 1
L it holds for all
y ≤ ˆ Y < Y 1
L that




L)] ≥ F2(ˆ Y ) − D2
00(ˆ Y ) > L2(ˆ Y ) − D2
00(ˆ Y ),
which, in turn, implies that L2
y(ˆ Y ) < F2
y(Y 1
L). So, Player 2 prefers to become the
follower at Y 1




L) < F2(Y 1




L). Hence, Player 2
has no incentive to deviate to any y ≤ ˆ Y ≤ Y 1
L. For any ˆ Y > Y 1
L, it holds that
V 2
y (ˆ Y ,Y 1






In the above proposition, the condition that Y 2
P ≥ Y 1
L cannot be dispensed with.
For suppose that Y 2
P < Y 1
L. Then, since νy(·) is continuous, there exists δ > 0,
such that L2
y(Y 1
L − δ) > F2
y(Y 1
L). So, Player 2 wishes to deviate and it follows from
Proposition 3 that no sequential equilibrium exists.
In preemption games with the rent-equalization property, many more equilibria
exist. However, they all lead to the same sequential scenario: Player 1 stops at Y 1
L
and Player 2 at Y 2
F.
Proposition 6. Let Γ be a preemption game satisfying Assumptions 1–3 and the
rent-equalization property. If Y 2
P > Y 1
L, then all preemption equilibria are of the
form (Y 1
L,Y 2), for any Y 2 ≥ Y 2
P.
Proof. It is dominant for Player 1 to stop whenever y ≥ Y 1
L. Given that
Y 2
P > Y 1
L, it is weakly dominant for Player 2 not to preempt Player 1, since for any
y ≤ ˆ Y 2 ≤ Y 1
L, it holds that
L2





So, any Markov equilibrium (¯ Y 1, ¯ Y 2) must have ¯ Y 1 = Y 1
L and ¯ Y 2 > Y 2
L. In
addition, for any y ∈ [Y 1
L,Y 2
P) it is optimal for Player 2 to become follower rather
than leader since W2(y) < F2(y). So, ¯ Y 2 ≥ Y 2
P. For all Y 2
P ≤ y < Y 2
F, however,
Player 2 is indiﬀerent between stopping immediately and not stopping immediately
because W2(y) = F2(y) due to rent equalization. So, any ¯ Y 2 ∈ SP leads to a Markov
equilibrium. Every ¯ Y 2 ≥ Y 2
F trivially leads to a Markov equilibrium.
Again, the result depends crucially on the assumption that Y 2
P > Y 1
L. If this is
not the case then Proposition 4 gives preemption equilibria.
144.3.2 Simultaneous Equilibria
Apart from sequential equilibria, there may exist equilibria in which both players
stop simultaneously. As is made clear in Section 4.2, such equilibria can never be
preemptive. In fact, they only exist if the value of becoming the leader at any point
in the preemption region is exceeded by the expected payoﬀ of simultaneous stopping
at some later date. Recall that, for Y ∗ > Y i
F,
Mi
y(Y ∗) = Di
00(y) + νy(Y ∗)
￿




where Mi(y) = Di
11(y) − Ii. By a similar reasoning as in Lemma 1 it can easily be
shown that (5) has a unique maximizer Y i
M.
Using this notation the following equilibrium can exist in some cases.
Proposition 7. Let Γ be a preemption game satisfying Assumptions 1–3. If Y ∗ >
Y 1
F ∨ Y 2
F is such that
Li(y) ≤ Mi
y(Y ∗),
for all y ∈ Si
P and i ∈ {1,2}, then (Y ∗,Y ∗) is a Markov equilibrium of Γ.
Proof. Consider the following cases.
1. y > Y ∗.
Given that layer j stops immediately, the best response of Player i is to stop imme-
diately as well, since Y ∗ > Y i
F.
2. y ≤ Y ∗.
Suppose that Player i deviates to ˆ Y i > Y ∗. Then Player j will stop at time τ(Y ∗).
Since Y ∗ > Y i
F, Player i will then stop immediately as well. So, V i
y(ˆ Y i,Y ∗) =
V i
y(Y ∗,Y ∗). Conversely, if Player i deviates to Y i
P ≤ ˆ Y i < Y ∗, then either
V i
y(ˆ Y i,Y ∗) = Li(y) ≤ Mi
y(Y ∗) = V i
y(Y ∗,Y ∗),
if y ≥ ˆ Y i, or
V i
y(ˆ Y i,Y ∗) = Li
y(ˆ Y i)
= Di
00(y) + νy(ˆ Y i)
h




00(y) + νy(ˆ Y i)
h
Mi(ˆ Y i,Y ∗) − Di
00(ˆ Y i)
i
= Mi(y,Y ∗) = V i
y(Y ∗,Y ∗),
if y < ˆ Y i.
155 Non-Cooperative Coordination and Rent-Equalization
If one views the use of continuous time simply as a modeling tool that opens up the
toolkit of stochastic calculus, then it is no great step to allow players to coordinate
“in between two instantaneous points in time”. This idea can be formalized by using
the deﬁnition of time as introduced in Dutta and Rustichini (1995). They view time
as the two-dimensional set T = R+×Z+, endowed with the lexicographic ordering,
denoted by ≥L, and the standard topology induced by ≥L. That is, a typical time
element is a pair s = (t,z) ∈ T , which consists of a continuous and a discrete part. In
the remainder, t refers to the continuous part and z to the discrete component. One
can think of the continuous part of time as “process time” in which the stochastic
environment evolves and the discrete part as “coordination time” in which players
coordinate their actions. The great advantage of using this set-up is that it allows
each part of the model to be analyzed in its most suitable way: stochastic evolution
in continuous time and strategic interaction discrete time.
Obviously, the stochastic structure that has been used so far needs to be adapted
to this new deﬁnition. Since we essentially want to keep the stochastic process (Yt)t≥0
deﬁned on the continuous part of time only, this is a fairly straightforward exercise.





F(t,z) ⊆ F(t0,z0) ⊆ F,
whenever (t,z) ≤L (t0,z0). For all y ∈ R, let Py be a probability measure on (Ω,F)




(t,z)≥L(0,0) such that Y(t,z) = Yt, for all t ∈ R+ and
z ∈ Z+. So, the extended process only moves in “process time” and is constant in
“coordination time”. This way, stochastic integrals can also be extended trivially to
operate on T .
In this framework, the threshold strategies introduced in Section 4.1 are not
so much the thresholds at which players stop, but the thresholds at which they
are willing to engage in a coordination game. As argued by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985), this coordination game is most conveniently modeled as a “grab–the–dollar”
game. This is an inﬁnitely repeated game the stage game of which is as depicted in
Figure 2. That is, play continues until at least one player “grabs the dollar”. We
Grab Don’t grab
Grab M1(y),M2(y) L1(y),F2(y)
Don’t grab F1(y),L2(y) play again
Figure 2: The coordination game.
allow for mixed strategies in the stage game. Given that the “grab–the–dollar” game
16is (potentially) inﬁnitely repeated we can restrict attention to stationary strategies
and denote the probability with which Player i grabs the dollar in the stage game
by αi.
The payoﬀ to Player i in this repeated game depends on the probability that she
is the ﬁrst to grab the dollar. For a given pair (α1,α2), the probability that Player i
grabs the dollar ﬁrst is denoted by pi(y) and is equal to




(1 − αi)z−1(1 − αj)z
=
αi(1 − αj)
αi + αj − αiαj .
(6)
Similar computations show that the probabilities that Player j grabs the dollar ﬁrst,
denoted by pj(y), and that both players grab the dollar simultaneously, denoted by
p3(y), are equal to
pj(y) =
αj(1 − αi)
αi + αj − αiαj , and p3(y) =
αiαj
αi + αj − αiαj , (7)
respectively.
The expected payoﬀ to Player i in the repeated game then equals
Wi
y(αi,αj) = pi(y)Li(y) + pj(y)Fi(y) + p3(y)Mi(y). (8)
It is obvious that it is a weakly dominant strategy to set αi = 1 whenever y ≥ Y i
F
and αi = 0, whenever y < Y i
P. Furthermore, it is easy to see that, for each y ∈ SP,





The expected payoﬀs in this equilibrium are easily conﬁrmed to be Wi
y(¯ αi, ¯ αj) =
Fi(y). In other words, non-cooperative coordination through a “grab–the–dollar”
game leads to rent-equalization. This gives, therefore, a non-cooperative justiﬁcation
for the assumption that Wi(y) = Fi(y) for y ∈ SP.
6 Examples
In this section some examples are given that illustrate the applicability of the results
derived so far. Attention is mainly focussed on preemption equilibria in games that
satisfy the rent-equalization property.
176.1 Spectrally Negative L´ evy Processes
A L´ evy process is an adapted process with independent and stationary increments.4
Each L´ evy process has a c` adl` ag version, which is the one we will work with. For
Borel sets U with 0 6∈ ¯ U, the Poisson random measure of (Yt)t≥0 is given by
N(t,U) :=
P
0<s≤t 1U(∆Ys). So, N(t,U) is the number of jumps with size in U. The
corresponding compensated Poisson random measure is denoted by ˜ N(t,U). The
intensity of the Poisson process is denoted by λ and the L´ evy measure is deﬁned as
m(U) := Ey[N(1,U)]. In diﬀerential form a time homogeneous L´ evy process can be
written as
dYt = µ(Yt)dt + σ(Yt)dWt +
Z
R
γ(Yt,z) ˜ N(dz,dt), (10)
where (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. Assume that (Yt)t≥0 takes values in
E = (a,b) and that
a − y < γ(y,z) ≤ 0, for all (y,z) ∈ E × R. (11)
This assumption ensures that (Yt)t≥0 has no upwards jumps. A L´ evy process that
satisﬁes (11) is called spectrally negative. Such processes are useful to model situa-
tions where “success comes on foot and leaves on horseback”.














Suppose that (12) has an increasing C2 solution g, such that g(a) = 0. Take Y ∗ ≥ y.


















All diﬀusions, i.e. L´ evy processes without jumps, are spectrally negative. For
several well-known classes of spectrally negative L´ evy processes the stochastic dis-
count factor νy(·) can be computed explicitly. First consider and arithmetic Brown-
ian motion (ABM). This is a L´ evy process the evolution of which is described by the
stochastic diﬀerential equation (10) with µ(y) = µ ∈ R, σ(y) = σ > 0, and λ = 0.
For this process it holds that
νy(Y ∗) = eβ1(y−Y ∗),
4See, for example, Øksendal and Sulem (2007).
18where β1 > 0 is the positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β2 + µβ − r = 0.
A second example is the geometric Brownian motion (GBM), which takes µ(y) =







where β1 > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0.




za−1(1 − z)b−1, a,b > 0,







where β1 > 0 is the positive root of the equation
1
2






β − (r + λ) + λ
Γ(a + b)Γ(b + β)
Γ(b)Γ(a + b + β)
= 0.
The results in this paper also apply to processes that exhibit mean-reversion.
Consider, for example, the diﬀusion
dY
Y
= η(¯ Y − Y )dt + σdW,
on R+, where ¯ Y is the long-run value of Y and ν determines the speed of mean-




σ2Y 2g00 + η(¯ Y − Y )g0 − rg.

























σ2θ(θ − 1) + η¯ Y θ − r = 0,
and b(θ) = 2(θ+(η/σ2)¯ Y ). Since we are looking for solutions with g(0) = 0, it must














These result can be used to ﬁnd the optimal thresholds Y i
F and Y i
L. For k = 0,1,
namely, these thresholds are obtained as the solution to the optimization problem
max
Y ∗ νy(Y ∗)[Di
1k(Y ∗) − Di
0k(Y ∗) − Ii],




1k(Y ∗) − Di
0k(Y ∗) − Ii] + νy(Y ∗)
∂
∂Y ∗[Di
1k(Y ∗) − Di
0k(Y ∗)] = 0. (13)
For ABM, GBM with beta distributed negative jumps, and mean-reversion we have
∂νy(Y ∗)
∂Y ∗ = −β1νy(Y ∗),
∂νy(Y ∗)
∂Y ∗ = −
β1










σ2Y ∗;θ1 + 1,b(θ1) + 1
￿
,
respectively. Note that this implies that in all these cases (13) does not depend on
y and that, thus, Y ∗ is a constant, as expected.
For several diﬀerent stochastic processes the preemption region is plotted in
Figure 3 as a function of volatility. The net present values are taken to be linear
in the underlying shock: Di
k`(y) = Dk`y, where Dk` are constants such that D10 >
D11 ≥ D00 ≥ D01 and D10−D00 > D11−D01. As can be easily seen, the preemption
region tends to get wider in the case of higher volatility. This happens because a
higher volatility does not inﬂuence the present values whereas it increases option
values. These option values have a bigger impact on the follower threshold than on
the preemption threshold. After all, preemptive pressure erodes the option value for
the leader. This implies that in games with higher levels on uncertainty, it is more
likely that a preemptive situation occurs.
6.2 Industry Investment and Welfare
Many papers on preemption games deal with ﬁrms investing in a new product, or
a new technology. An important question in such models is what the impact of




























































Figure 3: Preemption region as function of volatility σ for diﬀerent stochastic pro-
cesses. General parameter values are I = 1, r = .1, D10 = 10, D11 = 3, D00 = 2,
and D01 = 1. (a) GBM (solid lines) and GBM with negative Beta jumps (dashed
lines) with µ = .03, λ = .1, a = 1.5, b = 2; (b) exponential mean-reverting with
¯ Y = 2 and η = .015.
preemptive behaviour on welfare is. In general, it is diﬃcult to say anything about
this, but here we consider a fairly straightforward example. Let inverse demand in
the industry be given by D(Q) = Y − Q, where Y is a stochastic shift variable,
which follows the GBM
dY
Y
= µdt + σdW.
For simplicity it is assumed that there are no costs of production beyond the sunk
costs of investment I > 0, and that proﬁts are discounted at a rate r > 2µ+σ2. We



































Note that the stochastic process of interest is (Xt)t≥0, where Xt = Y 2
t . A straight-
forward application of Ito’s lemma shows that (Xt)t≥0 follows the GBM
dX
X





(r − 2µ − σ2)I,
21where β1 > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation σ2β(β−1)+(2µ+σ2)β−
r = 0. The leader and follower thresholds are given by
XL = 4X∗, and XF = 9X∗,
respectively. Consumer surplus in the case where k = 0,1,2 ﬁrms have invested is









































r − 2µ − σ2.
Note that
W1(x) := Di




r − 2µ − σ2, and
W2(x) := 2Di




r − 2µ − σ2.
A welfare maximizing social planner would choose the thresholds for the ﬁrst




νx(X1)[W1(X1) − I] + νx(X2)[W2(X2) − W1(X2) − I]
￿
.








respectively. Note that X2 > XF > XL > X1. So, a social planner would have
the ﬁrst ﬁrm invest sooner than in the case of exogenously determined ﬁrm roles,
but would have the second ﬁrm invest later. Since L(X1) T F(X1), no general
statement can be made about whether preemption leads to investment before the
social optimum. For various values of the volatility parameter, σ, the welfare loss for
both cases is plotted in Figure 4. As can be seen, the thresholds are (as expected)
increasing in volatility. Also, for small values of σ, preemptive investment actually
takes place later than the social optimum. The welfare loss (as % of the social
optimum) is higher when ﬁrm roles are exogenous. As volatility increase, the welfare
loss in both cases reduces. This is mainly driven by the fact that 2µ + σ2 ↑ r, so
that the present values and, hence, welfare levels diverge.
In order to disentangle the option and present value eﬀects on welfare results,
consider the following slight modiﬁcation. Rather than letting Y denote a stochastic

















































































Figure 4: Welfare analysis driven by GBM with µ = .02, r = .1, and I = 1: (a)
thresholds as a function of volatility σ, (b) welfare as a % of the social optimum for
the case with exogenous ﬁrm roles (dashed line) and endogenous ﬁrm roles (solid
line).
shift variable in the inverse demand function, suppose that P(Q) = Y D(Q), where
D(Q) = 1 − Q. This formulation makes all present values independent of σ and





where β1 > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation 1
2σ2β(β−1)+µβ−r = 0.
The leader and follower thresholds are given by
YL = 4Y ∗, and YF = 9Y ∗,
























For similar parameter values as in Figure 4, the plots in Figure 5 give the thresholds
and (absolute) welfare levels of the exogenous and endogenous ﬁrm role cases. Note
that even for somewhat higher values of σ, the preemption threshold is above the
social optimum. So, even though preemption leads to rent equalization, those rents
are still too high to induce ﬁrms to invest at the social optimum. Also, for higher
values of σ welfare levels are actually diverging. This implies that, unlike in the






















































Figure 5: Welfare analysis driven by GBM with µ = .02, r = .1, and I = 1: (a)
thresholds as a function of volatility σ, (b) welfare of the social optimum (solid line),
exogenous ﬁrm roles (dashed line) and endogenous ﬁrm roles (dotted line) cases.
previous case, higher levels of uncertainty actually lead to behaviour that is further
removed from the social optimum. Finally, welfare levels are actually increasing in
volatility. This is due to a balance of a present value and a stochastic discount eﬀect.
All welfare functions contain components of the form (y/Y ∗)β1F(Y ∗). The present
value component F(Y ∗) is homogeneous of degree one, whereas the stochastic dis-
count factor is of degree 1/β1 ∈ (0,1) (in Y ∗). Therefore, an increase in Y ∗ due to,
for example, higher volatility, has a bigger upward eﬀect on the present value than
it has a negative eﬀect on the discount factor.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents equilibrium results for a large class of timing games in which
there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage. The approach taken here exploits the Markovian
nature of many classes of often used stochastic processes. This allows for a more
straightforward analysis than in most existing contributions. In addition, the issue
of rent-equalization has been studied separately and embedded in the timing game,
which makes it easier to see how it arises and whether its presence is reasonable.
In some applications where the environment changes very rapidly – such as ﬁ-
nancial markets for high frequency traded products – it might not be. In that
case, no preemption equilibria exist and only collusive simultaneous stopping equi-
libria or asymmetric sequential equilibria can be obtained. In fact, no symmetric
equilibria may exist at all. A problem with the asymmetric equilibria arises in
24symmetric games. In such games there are two asymmetric equilibria (YL,YF) and
(YF,YL) and it is not clear, a priori, which one should be selected. In either case,
though, the leader and follower roles are determined later than in the case where
rent-equalization is possible. Therefore, somewhat contradictory, in fast moving
situations, stopping gets delayed.
The welfare analysis in Section 6.2 suggests that, in industry investment situa-
tions, preemption is actually a good thing as it gets us closer to the social optimum
than asymmetric sequential equilibria do. Therefore, the availability of time for
coordination (i.e. playing of the “grab-the-dollar” game) is socially desirable.
Another advantage of the set-up in this paper is that the ideas can easily be
adapted to games in which there is a second mover advantage (wars of attrition).
Also, games with both a ﬁrst mover advantage on the upside and a second mover
advantage on the downside can be analyzed using this framework. In particular, this
opens up the possibility of a proper analysis of the investment and disinvestment
behavior of competing ﬁrms.
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